Toledo Board of Education President Steven Steel's
"perceived" conflict
Note the information presented below provides the
reader with source materials to form his/her own opinions. However,
opinions of the Coalition are included in the text.
What is a conflict of interest?
What is the conflict of interest
involving current Board President Steven Steel?
Why is the conflict of interest
important to the TPS community?
What does the Ohio Ethics Commission
say about Steel's conflict of interest?
What does legal counsel retained
by TPS have to say about Steel's conflict?
How long has Steel known about
his conflict of interest? Has Steel been honest with the Board and
our community about his conflict of interest?
What should Steel do?
A conflict of interest exists
when personal and professional/fiduciary responsibilities are incompatible.
Wikipedia describes a conflict
of interest as:
".. a situation in which someone in a position of trust,
such as a lawyer, insurance adjuster, a politician, executive
or director of a corporation or a medical research scientist or
physician, has competing professional or personal interests. Such
competing interests can make it difficult to fulfill his or her
duties impartially. A conflict of interest exists even if no unethical
or improper act results from it. A conflict of interest can create
an appearance of impropriety that can undermine confidence in
the person, profession, or court system."
Steel has a "perceived" conflict
of interest as his wife is a TPS teacher. In the campaign
for Toledo Board of Education, the Urban Coalition sent Steel a
letter dated August
16, 2005 suggesting that due to his conflict of interest he
should withdraw from the race. In our letter we stated:
In March of 2006, the contract with the TFT expires. Therefore
one of the first actions to come before the new board that takes
office January 1, 2006 is the negotiation and approval of a new
TFT collective bargaining contract. Since your family income,
health benefits, etc. are directly affected by this contract,
you may have to abstain from voting on this crucial contract in
order to avoid any potential conflict and perception of a conflict
of interest.
Further in the letter we said:
The perception of a conflict of interest exists in our minds.
We believe that this is an issue that will taint every vote you
participate in which affects teachers with the question: Would
Mr. Steel have voted differently if his wife were not a TPS teacher?
Just why should any of us be concerned
about Steel's conflict of interest? Simply put, the public
needs a Board independent of "influence" of its collective
bargaining units to assure that the interests of Toledo's children
and the public are represented by the elected Board and not co opted
by the bargaining units.
While doing research, we ran across an excellent reference source,
A
Collective Bargaining Primer for Michigan School Board Members.
Yes, it is for Michigan. As a consequence, some of the references
relate to statutes not applicable in Ohio. Nonetheless, it has some
interesting information such as the best explanation we have found
as to why school board members should be free of conflicts and why
unions are actively engaged in selecting their bosses through election
(starts on page 55):
School board members take an oath that requires them to faithfully
carry out the obligations of their offices to the best of their
ability.
However, the collective bargaining process frequently puts them
at odds with their statutory and ethical responsibilities. Ronald
Booth sums up the slings and arrows that board members face when
combining labor relations, human relations and politics:
"If unions do not get what they want at the bargaining
table, board members and superintendents can find themselves
in jeopardy. If the politics of impasse or strike doesn’t
get the superintendent fired, then sometimes it’s the
loss of school spirit that often follows the strike or the teachers’
refusal to maintain acceptable relationships with students and
parents. Even without the rigors of bargaining, superintendents
can seal their own doom through neglect of faculty attitudes.
… Today’s teachers not only talk about their problems
out of school, they organize campaigns to unseat board members
and to remove the superintendent.
That leaves school boards and superintendents on the horns
of this dilemma: How do they protect the public from the unions
without making themselves the sacrificial lambs? Some boards
have said, let’s forget the public and give the unions
what they want. Other boards have stood fast against the union’s
demands and been ousted at the next election, soon followed
to the sidelines by their superintendents. Clearly, what is
called ‘collective bargaining’ in the private sector
is not necessarily the same thing in the public sector.”
Unions routinely recruit pro-union candidates to run for
public office. The unions then use their considerable resources
to get these candidates — who often do not reveal their
union support while campaigning — elected to school boards.
Once elected, these board members give the union clout on both
sides of the bargaining table. Tracey Bailey, a former
AFT member and 1993 National Teacher of the Year, is a frequent
critic of the unions and their political nature, calling them
“special interests protecting the status quo” and
pillars of “a system that too often rewards mediocrity and
incompetence.”
What does the Ethics Commission say
about Steel's conflict of interests? On January 15th, we
learned through an inquiry to the Ohio Ethics Commission of a letter
Steel sent to the Commission dated August 29, 2005 (13 days after
our letter to Steel) where he asked for an opinion. And what did
he find out? In a letter
from the Ethics Commission dated November 3, 2005 (5 days before
the 11/8/05 election) the Ethics Commission agreed with our concerns
and stated that Steel would not be able to vote. The Ethics Commission
said,
However, because your spouse is a board member of the teachers'
union, she has a sufficiently definite and direct interest in
the master contract to invoke the prohibitions of R.C. 2921.42(A)(l).
Therefore, if you are elected and serve as a school board member,
you would be prohibited from voting, discussing, deliberating,
recommending, or otherwise using your authority or influence,
as a board member, to secure ratification of the collective bargaining
agreement between the district and the teachers' union.
From the attachment to the letter - Information Sheet on Family
Member Hires:
Where an official's spouse is employed by the public agency
she serves, and the official is covered under health insurance
provided by the agency to her spouse, there is an additional restriction.
In that case, the official is receiving a thing of value, for
purposes of R.C. 102.03(D) and (E). While the official is not
prohibited from receiving the health insurance coverage, she is
prohibited from taking any action to approve the union contract
if it includes health insurance benefits and she is covered under
those benefits.
It should be noted that Steel did not share this opinion with anyone
on the board or legal counsel until January 2008 even though the
Coalition and Board member Fisher had asked Steel to provide documentation
regarding his wife's status with the TFT and information on when
he terminated his health care benefits through his wife's employment
with TPS. At the January 3rd Board organizational meeting Steel
in defending himself against the allegations of conflict of interest
provided the Board with Ethics Commission Advisory Opinion 82-003.
He provided no further information even though he had a letter from
the Ethics Commission citing Advisory Opinions 85-009,
87-008,
88-007,
89-005,
85-015,
86-010,
92-012
and 92-017.
In addition the Ethics Commission cited R.C. 4117.10
and 4117.20
and suggested he consult the school district's legal counsel for
advice. There is no record of Steel ever completing his due diligence
by requesting a legal opinion from District legal counsel. From
the commission letter:
You may also wish to consider whether provisions of law that
are outside the jurisdiction of the Ethics Commission would affect
your service as a school board member. For example, under R.C.
41 17.1 O(C), the "designated representative" of a board
of education "is responsible for negotiations in the collective
bargaining process." The board of education must then accept
or reject the proposed collective bargaining agreement reached
between the board's representative and the employee organization.
See RC. 41 17.10(B) and (C). See also R.C. 4117.20 (prohibiting
a person who has an interest in the outcome of bargaining which
is in conflict with the public employer's interest from participating
on behalf of the public employer in the collective bargaining
process, except that the person may vote on ratification of the
agreement).
For more guidance about the application of these provisions
you may wish to consult the school district's legal advisor if
you are elected.
Squire, Sanders and Dempsey
provided TPS with a legal
opinion (Supporting
documentation for legal opinion) which is dated 1-16-08. SSD
states in their opinion:
Despite the restrictions discussed above with
respect to an individual's contract or terms of employment, the
ethics law does not prohibit a board member from discussing or
voting on a union contract when the spouse is a member of the
union unless: (1) the spouse is an officer or employee of the
union; (2) the spouse is on the contract negotiating team; or
(3) the board member receives health insurance benefits through
the spouse's coverage with the district. While a union's master
contract is a public contract, an individual teacher's interest
in the master contract is not sufficiently definite and direct
as to invoke the prohibitions of R.C. Section 2921.42(A)(l), which
prohibit a public official from using the influence of office
to secure the employment of a family member.
SSD states further:
We understand that Dr. Steel does not receive
health benefits through his wife's District coverage. Thus, so
long as his wife is not an officer or employee of the union or
a member of the union's contract negotiating team, under the applicable
opinions of the Ohio Ethics Commission with respect to R.C. Chapter
102 and R.C. Section 2921.42, the applicable opinions of the Ohio
Attorney General with respect to R.C. Sections 33 13.33 and 33
19.20 and the limited case law precedents and guidance
available with respect to these provisions and R.C. Section 4117.20,
Dr. Steel would not be prohibited under any of those statutes
from participating in the discussions and deliberations of the
Board and administration with respect the collective bargaining
agreement between the Board and its teachers' union or from voting
on the collective bargaining agreement presented for the board's
approval.
We draw your attention to the statement above "the
limited case law precedents and guidance available with respect
to these provisions and R.C. Section 4117.20." From what we
have learned there is no case law involving 4117.20. This makes
the interpretation of this statute suspect. Squire, Sanders and
Dempsey is relying totally upon the opinions of the Ethics Commission.
Further, SSD does not provide any guidance as to how the Board and
Steel should proceed. They simply clear the way, barring any subsequent
lawsuit that would clarify 4117.20, for Steel to participate in
the negotiations process involving the TFT.
4117.20
Prohibiting conflict of interest in bargaining.
(A) No person who is a member of the same local, state, national,
or international organization as the employee organization with
which the public employer is bargaining or who has an interest
in the outcome of the bargaining, which interest is in conflict
with the interest of the public employer, shall participate on
behalf of the public employer in the collective bargaining process
except that the person may, where entitled, vote on the ratification
of an agreement.
(B) The public employer shall immediately remove from his
role, if any, in the collective bargaining negotiations or in
any matter in connection with negotiations any person who violates
division (A) of this section.
Effective Date: 04-01-1984
The key elements that have not been determined by case law are:
1) What constitutes an interest? 2) Is being a decision maker, such
as a Board member, considered a participant in the collective bargaining
process?
Common sense would imply that directing the process, determining
priorities, evaluating tradeoffs and other activities such as these
would be considered participating in the collective bargaining process.
We also have determined that Superintendent John Foley also has
a wife who is a TPS teacher. So, it could be construed that Foley
should also recuse himself from being a participant in the collective
bargaining process. Foley was the contact person in obtaining the
legal opinion from Squire, Sanders and Dempsey. As Foley also has
the same conflict of interest as Steel, by inference it seems apparent
why the SSD opinion is vague and does not provide guidance on how
the Board should proceed. What questions were legal counsel asked
to respond to by Foley?
So why did Steel keep the Ethics Commission
letter to himself? Well, of course, this is only speculation
as we can't read minds, but here are some reasonable explanations.
1. To release the letter before the 11-8-05 election may have
spelled defeat. Steel finished third in a race for three seats
and beat appointed Board member Steven Thomas by just 711 votes
(21,761 to 21,050). It would have also confirmed the Coalition's
concern about a Steel candidacy for School Board.
2. Releasing the letter also would have sparked interest by the
board to assure that Steel complied with the applicable laws as
interpreted by the Ethics Commission. (We still don't know when
Steel withdrew from the health plan and if he violated state statute
during the two years this letter was kept secret.
What should Steel do? RECUSE
himself from voting, discussing, deliberating, recommending, or
otherwise using his authority or influence, as a board member, to
secure ratification of the collective bargaining agreement between
the district and the TFT to avoid any appearance of impropriety.
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